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We are assuming that the mind contains "multiple executive systems with preferential access to different memories and different action programs" or "modules" for short. Some of the mind's modules are associated with what we call "consciousness."

So, something like a tribal-wide-social "consciousness module," a school-social module, a work-social module, a sport-enthusiast-social module, neighbor-social module, family-social module, a no-one-else-around module, and possibly others depending upon how a person  lives.

The modules described above could be extremely simple algorithms (rules of behavior) with pointers to "tables" (more algorithms) for the body language, spoken language, dress code, etc. that are appropriate for the specific social setting. These social modules are "mutually exclusive" (only one can be "selected" at a time). Moreover, which module is selected would be determined by a subconscious "multiplexer" ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiplexer ) that is associated with the processing of environmental cues.

A single self-deceived or several subselves divided?

Would we lie to ourselves? We don't need to. Rather than a single self equipped with a few bivariate[1] processes, the mind is composed of a dissociated aggregation of subselves processing qualitatively different information relevant to different adaptive problems. Each subself selectively processes the information coming in to the brain as well as information previously stored in the brain. http://www.jayhanson.org/_Biology/Kenrick.html

Two problems with "self-deception": No "self" and no "deception"

While the idea that being wrong can be strategically advantageous in the context of social strategy is sound, the idea that there is a "self" to be deceived might not be. The modular view of the mind finesses this difficulty and is useful – perhaps necessary – for discussing the phenomena currently grouped under the term "self deception." http://www.jayhanson.org/_Biology/Kurzban.html

Conscious Thought Is for Facilitating Social and Cultural Interactions: How Mental Simulations Serve the Animal–Culture Interface
 Roy F. Baumeister and E. J. Masicampo
Florida State University

Five empirically based critiques have undermined the standard assumption that conscious thought is primarily for input (obtaining information from the natural environment) or output (the direct control of action). Instead, we propose that conscious thought is for internal processing, to facilitate downstream interaction with the social and cultural environment. Human consciousness enables the construction of meaningful, sequential thought, as in sentences and narratives, logical reasoning, counting and quantification, causal understanding, narratives, and the simulation of events (including nonpresent ones). Conscious thought sequences resemble short films that the brain makes for itself, thereby enabling different parts of brain and mind to share information. The production of conscious thoughts is closely linked to the production of speech because the human mind evolved to facilitate social communication and information sharing, as culture became humankind's biological strategy. The influence of conscious thought on behavior can be vitally helpful but is mostly indirect. Conscious simulation processes are useful for understanding the perspectives of social interaction partners, for exploring options in complex decisions, for replaying past events (both literally and counterfactually) so as to learn, and for facilitating participation in culture in other ways. http://www.jayhanson.org/_Biology/consciousness.pdf